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Lifetime incomes of private equity general partners are affected by their current funds’ performance
through both carried interest profit sharing provisions, and also by the effect of the current fund’s performance
on general partners’ abilities to raise capital for future funds. We present a learning-based framework
for estimating the market-based pay for performance arising from future fundraising. For the typical
first-time private equity fund, we estimate that implicit pay for performance from expected future fundraising
is approximately the same order of magnitude as the explicit pay for performance general partners
receive from carried interest in their current fund, implying that the performance-sensitive component
of general partner revenue is about twice as large as commonly discussed. Consistent with the learning
framework, we find that implicit pay for performance is stronger when managerial abilities are more
scalable and weaker when current performance contains less new information about ability. Specifically,
implicit pay for performance is stronger for buyout funds compared to venture capital funds, and declines
in the sequence of a partnership’s funds. Our framework can be adapted to estimate implicit pay for
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Compensation agreements in private equity (PE) partnerships typically give general partners (GPs)
a management fee that is a percentage (usually 1 to 2%) of the amount of capital committed to the
fund, as well as “carried interest” equal to a percentage of the proﬁts (usually 20%). The carried
interest, together with the GP’s own equity contribution to the fund, links GP compensation to
performance to a much greater extent than is typical in public corporations. This strong pay for
performance, and the resulting explicit incentives to make value-maximizing decisions, is commonly
thought to be an important driver of the success of private equity ﬁrms.1
Yet, these explicit compensation formulas represent only part of the total pay for performance
faced by private equity GPs. GPs’ lifetime incomes are highly dependent on their ability to raise
capital in the future, which in turn is a function of the performance of the GPs’ current funds.
Consequently, in addition to the carried interest and the partners’ own investment in the fund,
general partners’ lifetime incomes are substantially aﬀected by their funds’ performance through
its impact on subsequent fundraising. GPs’ total pay for performance equals the sum of pay for
performance features of the explicit compensation contract and the implicit, market-based pay for
performance caused by the relation between today’s performance and the ability to raise capital in
the future.
This type of indirect pay for performance is not speciﬁc to private equity; indeed, it is a sub-
stantial source of incentives in many settings.2 Yet, despite the widespread theoretical interest in
implict incentives and their importance to real-world organizations, little is known about their ac-
tual magnitude. This gap in our knowledge is surprising given that understanding the size of the
pay for performance relation through market-based rather than compensation-based mechanisms is
essential to drawing inferences about managers’ motivations.
In this paper, we estimate the magnitude of implicit pay for performance in the private equity
industry. To do so, we exploit the fact that in the private equity industry, GPs’ explicit compensation
1See, for example, Jensen (1989), Kaplan (1989), and Kaplan and Stromberg (2009).
2Examples include promotion or elimination tournaments inside corporations (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Green
and Stokey, 1983; Rosen, 1986; Han et al., 2009), the possibility that a CEO will be ﬁred for poor performance (e.g.
Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), and the possibility that securities analysts will be promoted
or ﬁred depending on the accuracy of their forecasts (Hong and Kubik, 2000; Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2003). Like
the private equity industry, market-based pay for performance in other asset management settings such as mutual
funds and hedge funds arises from a relation between performance and future inﬂows of new investment.
1is given by well-known formulas that are a function of fund size and the fund’s return. In addition,
we observe a time series of a partnership’s funds and their performance, so it is possible to estimate
the extent to which a fund’s current return aﬀects its general partners’ future fundraising, and hence
their expected future income.
Our estimates allow us to address a number of important questions about the private equity
industry. In particular, for every extra percentage point of returns (or every extra dollar) earned
for the current fund’s investors, how much, in expectation, does the lifetime income of the fund’s
general partner change? How strong is this implicit pay for performance relation relative to the
much-discussed explicit one? Theoretically, what factors ought to aﬀect the size of change in
partners’ lifetime incomes as a function of fund returns? Do these predicted patterns appear true
in the data? More generally, how do today’s returns aﬀect the ability of partnerships to raise
capital subsequently? How important is future fundraising to the total (explicit plus implicit)
pay-performance relation facing private equity general partners?
To answer these questions, we formalize the logic by which good performance today could lead
to higher future incomes for GPs through an eﬀect on expected future fundraising. We assume that
a private equity partnership potentially has an ability to earn abnormal returns for their investors,
but this ability is unknown. Given an observation of returns, investors update their assessment of
the GP’s ability, and, in turn, decide whether the GP is able to raise another fund, and if so, how
much capital to allocate to it. In our framework, there is a maximum number of future funds the
GP can potentially manage in sequence, and failure to raise a follow-on fund at any point in the
sequence means that the GP is unable to raise any more funds subsequently. We derive predictions
about the relation between the performance of a particular fund and the fund’s partners’ abilities to
raise capital in the future. Intuitively, the more informative the fund’s performance is about GPs’
abilities, the more sensitive future fundraising should be to today’s performance. In addition, the
way in which abilities can be “scaled” will aﬀect investors’ willingness to commit higher quantities
of capital for a given level of managerial ability. These larger funds will lead, in expectation, to
higher compensation for the partners, since PE compensation agreements almost always change
linearly with fund size. Given this setup, we derive an explicit formula calculating the eﬀect of an
incremental increase in fund performance today on expected future GP compensation.
We test these predictions using a sample of 843 private equity partnerships who manage 1,745
2buyout, venture capital, and real estate funds for which we have information on fund performance.
The ability of managers to translate their skills to larger funds depends on the nature of the pro-
duction process. Given Metrick and Yasuda’s (2010) ﬁnding that buyout funds are more scalable
than venture funds, our theoretical framework suggests that the future fundraising of buyout funds
should be more sensitive to performance than that of venture capital funds. In addition, learning
about ability suggests that the performance of later funds (for example, a partnership’s third or
fourth fund) should have less impact on the assessment of ability and hence be less strongly related
to future inﬂows of capital than would similar performance in a partnership’s ﬁrst fund.
Our empirical results are consistent with these predictions. For buyout, venture capital, and
real estate funds, both the probability of raising a follow-on fund and the size of the follow-on
conditional on raising one are signiﬁcantly positively related to the performance of the current
fund. The magnitude of these relations varies with the scalability of the investments. Buyout
funds, which are the most scalable, have the strongest relations, while venture capital funds, which
are the least scalable, have the weakest relation.
Importantly, we ﬁnd that these relations are stronger for funds that are earlier in a partnership’s
sequence of funds, that is, younger partnerships have stronger relations between future fundraising
and current fund returns than older partnerships. This suggests that fund ﬂows in the private
equity industry reﬂect learning about ability over time, and that the strength of the market-based,
implicit pay for performance facing a private equity partnership depends on the extent of its prior
track record.3
Given these estimates of the sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance, we next turn
to calculating the magnitude of the pay-performance relation facing general partners, and consider
the relative magnitudes of its explicit (from carried interest in the current fund) and implicit (from
future fundraising) components. Our theoretical framework provides an explicit formula for the
change in general partners’ lifetime incomes as a function of the return of the current fund. To
perform the calculations, we use this formula, our estimates of the sensitivity of future fundraising
to current performance, parameters reﬂecting the characteristics of our sample of private equity
3It is likely that similar patterns hold in the ﬂow-performance relations for other asset mangement settings, in
which learning is likely to play an important role in determining fund ﬂows, such as mutual funds (e.g. Berk and Green,
2004) and hedge funds. In the mutual fund literature, the possibility that the sensitivity of ﬂows to performance
depends on fund age is generally ignored. A notable exception is Chevalier and Ellison (1997), who ﬁnd that the
sensitivity is indeed larger for younger funds.
3funds, and estimates of expected carried interest and management fees taken from Metrick and
Yasuda’s (2010) simulations.
For an average-sized ﬁrst-time buyout fund in our sample ($417.5 million), we estimate that for
an extra percentage point of return (IRR) to limited partners in the current fund, general partners
receive on average an extra $3.75 million in direct fees in the current fund.4 For this fund, estimates
of expected incremental revenue from future funds for each additional percentage point of IRR in the
current fund (using the median of the expected compensation estimates from Metrick and Yasuda
(2010)), vary from $5.42 million if we assume the GP potentially runs up to three more funds to
$11.30 million if instead the GP potentially runs up to ﬁve more funds. An alternative approach
is to calculate the expected incremental GP revenue from future funds per extra dollar returned
to limited partners in the current fund. For every extra dollar returned to LPs in the current
fund, the GP earns $0.25 in carry (assuming that the carry is “in the money”)5, while estimates of
incremental revenue from future funds for the average ﬁrst-time buyout fund are $0.315 to $0.657.
Both approaches yield the same ratios of estimated implicit to explicit pay for performance, which
are 1.45 to 3.02.
We also perform the same calculations for venture capital and real estate funds. Expected
compensation from future fundraising is less sensitive to current performance for these types of
funds than for buyout funds, with venture capital funds displaying the least sensitivity. For an
average-sized ﬁrst-time venture capital fund, estimates of incremental GP revenue from future funds
per incremental dollar of returns to LPs in the current fund range from $0.105 to $0.133, depending
on whether the GP potentially runs up to three or up to ﬁve more funds. For an average-sized
ﬁrst-time real estate fund, the corresponding estimates are $0.329 to $0.516. The corresponding
ratios of estimated implicit to explicit pay for performance are 0.48 to 0.61 for venture capital funds
and 1.51 to 2.37 for real estate funds.
Consistent with the learning framework, the ratio declines in the sequence of funds for all types
of funds. The decline is fairly weak for buyout funds, sharper for real estate funds, and sharpest
for venture capital funds. Assuming the GP potentially runs up to ﬁve future funds in addition
4For consistency with Metrick and Yasuda (2010), all dollar amounts are present values using a discount rate of
5%.
5Using a typical carry of 20%, for LPs to receive an extra dollar, the fund must earn an extra $1.25 in proﬁts,
with $0.25 going to the GPs.
4to the current fund (regardless of the current fund’s position in a partnership’s sequence of funds),
our estimates of the ratios of implicit to explicit pay for performance for buyout funds are 3.02
if the current fund is the ﬁrst in a buyout partnership’s sequence, 2.62 if the current fund is the
second in sequence, and 2.13 if the current fund is the third in sequence. For real estate funds, the
corresponding ratios of implicit to explicit pay for performance are 2.37, 1.70, and 1.37. For venture
capital funds, they are 0.61, 0.44, and 0.18.
Overall, the estimates indicate that implicit pay for performance from future fundraising is an
important component of the total pay for performance relation facing private equity GPs, and of
approximately the same order of magnitude as explicit pay for performance from carried interest.
Consistent with the learning framework, which suggests that the sensitivity of future fundraising to
current performance should depend on the extent to which current performance adds incremental
information to the market’s assessment of the general partners’ abilities, we ﬁnd that implicit pay
for performance, relative to the explicit component, declines in a partnership’s sequence of funds.
Indeed, we ﬁnd that if we calculate implicit pay for performance using estimates of the relation
between future fundraising and current performance that ignore sequence eﬀects, the estimates we
obtain are signiﬁcantly larger, particularly for venture capital funds.
This paper is related to a number of diﬀerent literatures. Our ﬁnding that implicit pay for
performance from future fundraising is an important component of total pay for performance in
private equity buttresses the arguments in prior work that the incentives of GPs are an important
reason for value improvements in private equity transactions. Kaplan (1989) and Smith (1990)
document that operating proﬁtability increases following buyouts, although this pattern appears
weaker for more recent buyouts (Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song, 2010). Jensen (1989) and Kaplan
and Stromberg (2009) attribute these value increases in large part to the incentives facing general
partners, although both focus on direct rather than indirect incentives. Kaplan and Stromberg
(2001, 2003, 2005) and Hart (2001) emphasize the role of GPs’ value-maximizing incentives in
explaining the complexity and optimality of venture capital ﬁnancing contracts. Kaplan and Schoar
(2005), in perhaps the most related analysis to that done here, emphasize the talent of particular
partnerships and ﬁnd that the size of future funds is positively related to historical performance,
but do not explictly consider how performance aﬀects the ability to raise future funds as opposed
to the size of future funds, nor how this sensitivity varies in the cross-section of partnerships or in
5the sequence of funds raised by a given partnership. None of this work attempts to estimate the
magnitude of the eﬀect of today’s performance on GPs’ future income.
Our results are also related to Metrick and Yasuda (2010), who ﬁnd, based on the explicit
terms of the partnership agreement, that approximately two-thirds of expected revenue to GPs
from the current fund comes from ﬁxed-revenue components that are not sensitive to performance.
Our results suggest that their calculations understate the total incentive compensation that general
partners have, and that performance-based compensation in private equity partnerships is larger
than previously thought.
Our results on the declining strength of implicit pay for performance in the sequence of funds
are also consistent with the darker view of implicit pay for performance in private equity advanced
by Gompers (1996), who shows that younger venture capital partnerships are more likely to “grand-
stand” by taking portfolio companies public prematurely in an eﬀort to boost performance to aid in
fundraising. While Gompers (1996) implicitly assumes that fundraising is more sensitive to perfor-
mance for younger partnerships, our paper is the ﬁrst to document this relation this empirically. An
interesting topic for future research is to understand how young buyout partnerships, who we show
have the strongest implicit pay for performance relation among diﬀerent types of private equity
funds, respond to the resulting incentives.
Closely related to this work is a large literature on mutual fund inﬂows and their relation to
historical performance. Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998),
Barclay, Pearson and Weisbach (1998), and Sensoy (2009) all estimate regressions predicting the
inﬂows to mutual funds as a function of a fund’s historical performance, and ﬁnd a strongly positive
(nonlinear) relation. While our framework is couched in terms of the private equity industry, our
approach can be readily adapted to other settings in which implicit pay for performance stems from
the eﬀect of current performance on inﬂows of new investments, such as the mutual fund and hedge
fund industries. Adapting our framework to quantify the total pay for performance relations facing
mutual fund and hedge fund managers is an interesting topic for future research.
More generally, our work adds empirical evidence on the idea pioneered by Fama (1980) that
market-based mechanisms can be an important source of pay for performance incentives. Despite the
potential importance of implicit incentives in a variety of settings, little is known about their actual
magnitudes. The explicit (and observable) compensation formulas in private equity partnerships,
6together with the empirical relation between fund performance and future fundraising, allow for
quantiﬁcation of both implicit and explicit pay for performance in private equity, which in other
contexts clearly exist but are hard to measure. In doing so, our work is in the spirit of Gibbons and
Murphy (1992), who emphasize the importance of understanding total, rather than only explicit,
pay for performance. Given the magnitude of the decline in implicit pay for performance over a
partnership’s life, our estimates imply that total pay for performance declines over a partnership’s
life. The extent to which this compensation system is eﬃcient, and why explicit pay for performance
does not typically adjust enough in later funds to oﬀset this decline, is an interesting question for
future research.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II lays out the theoretical framework
described above. Section III describes the database of private equity funds used in the analysis.
Section IV presents estimates of the eﬀect of today’s fund returns on future fundraising. Section
V performs calculations that transform these estimates into pay for perforamance relations, using
the theoretical framework in Section II as a basis for the calculations. Section VI discusses the
implications of this work and concludes.
II. Theoretical Framework
In this section we present a theoretical framework in which investors assign cash ﬂows to private
equity partnerships based on their perceptions of GPs’ abilities to earn proﬁts. Investors observe
the returns earned by a partnership, and based on their posterior estimate of GP ability collectively
decide ﬁrst, whether to invest in the GP’s next fund (i.e., whether the GP is able to raise another
fund), and second, how much to invest. Given that the compensation system in private equity
partnerships is almost always a linear function of fund size (Gompers and Lerner, 1999)6,w es h o w
that this capital allocation process leads to a strong relation between performance in a current fund
and that fund’s general partners’ future compensation.
6Gompers and Lerner (1999) document that the most successful partnerships are sometimes able to increase their
carry percentage in future funds. We do not have information on the carry percentage of speciﬁc funds, and therefore
cannot formally incorporate this eﬀect into our empirical analysis. Because this eﬀect results in higher compensation
in future funds for a given level of performance, by omitting it we understate the magnitude of the eﬀect of current
performance on future compensation, especially for ﬁrst-time funds. We thank Josh Lerner for pointing this out.
7A. Setup
To formalize this idea, we assume that a particular GP currently manages a fund and could po-
tentially manage up to N more funds in sequence in the future. The GP has ability equal to θ,
which is a measure of his ability to earn returns through private equity investing.7 We assume that
θ is unobservable and that there is symmetric information, so all agents, including the GP himself,
have the same estimate of its value.8 We also assume that θ is constant over time for a particu-
lar partnership, which abstracts away from issues of changing partnership composition, investment
environments, or changing ability over time due to health or other considerations.
Let i denote the sequence of funds managed by a given GP, ri be the net return to LPs for fund
i, Ii be the size (committed capital) of fund i,a n dIi ∗ k(ri) be the total revenue earned by the
GP for managing fund i, where k(r) is an increasing and diﬀerentiable function, representing the
fraction of the initial size of the fund that is earned by the GP if performance is r. The function k(r)
represents the total proﬁts from running a fund that has a return equal to r, including management
fees, carried interest, and other income earned by the fund, such as additional fees earned by funds
for managing portfolio companies. We characterize GP compensation in this manner following
Metrick and Yasuda (2010), who provide estimates for k(.) using a simulation approach.
We assume that the fund returns are increasing (in expectation) with the GP’s ability, θ, specif-





for all i, where s is the precision of the distribution. Before any returns
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for all i (DeGroot, 1970 provides a derivation of this Bayesian updating formula).
7It is possible that GPs could be rewarded through future fundraising for either absolute or relative (abnormal)
returns. Our empirical analysis examines both possibilities.
8The assumption that there is symmetric information about managers’ abilities dates to Holmstrom (1982), and
has been used in similar learning models by Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2009), and
others. Implicitly, the idea is that anyone who can become a GP is smart, hard-working, well-educated, etc., but the
key factor determining who can earn (abnormal) returns is an unobservable match between the individual and the
tasks associated with earning proﬁts as a general partner.
9θ0 represents the expected skill of a particular GP conditional on all observable characteristics prior to any returns
being observed. Diﬀerent GPs will therefore have diﬀerent values of θ0 from one another and consequently can raise
initial funds of diﬀerent sizes.
8We assume that investors base their decision about whether and how much capital to allocate to
the GP’s fund based on this updated assessment of θ. Speciﬁcally, a GP is able to raise a follow-on
fund to fund i with probability p(θi), where p(.) is a weakly increasing, diﬀerentiable function with
range [0,1]. If investors decide to allocate capital to the GP’s next fund, the amount they allocate
is given by f (θi), where f (.) is a weakly increasing, diﬀerentiable function with range (0,∞].W e
assume the GP could potentially run a total of N +1funds over his lifetime (i.e, the initial fund
plus up to N more). Thus the expected size of the follow-on fund is equal to p(θi)f (θi). The upper
bound on the number of future funds, N, is exogenously determined (e.g., a function of the GP’s
initial age). Importantly, we assume that if the GP ever fails to raise a follow-on, he cannot raise
any funds subsequent to that point.
B. Cross-sectional implications
This simple learning model characterizes the way that fund returns aﬀect future fundraising and,
consequently, the future expected compensation for the funds’ partners. Conditional on the sequence















, for i ≤ N, and zero for i = N.
B. 1. Sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance across partnership types
The sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance is governed by the derivatives of p(θi)
and f (θi) with respect to ri, which are equal to p￿ (θi) s
τ+is and f￿ (θi) s
τ+is, respectively. Intuitively,
a more steeply sloped p(.) function means that for a small increase in ability, the market is relatively
more willing to allocate capital to a fund, presumably because the fund can proﬁtably invest rela-
tively large increases in capital, i.e., the fund is more “scalable”. Holding i ﬁxed, a larger weighting
term s
τ+is reﬂects a greater relative infomativeness of the return to the market’s perception of the
GP’s ability.
We expect buyout funds to be more scalable, and hence exhibit a larger f￿ (.), than other types of
funds, particularly venture funds. For example, if a manager is shown to be talented at buying out
companies and increasing value, he can likely buy out larger companies and increase value similarly
to what he has done with smaller companies if the market is willing to fund these investments.
In contrast, if a manager has demonstrated that she is talented at investing in startup companies,
9she is unlikely to be able to increase fund size much because the size of startup investments is
not scalable (and because it is not feasible to simply increase the number of investments given
that increasing value is a time-consuming process).10 It is less clear for what types of funds we
would expect p￿ (.) to be greater. We conjecture that p￿ (.)might be higher for buyout funds than
venture for the same scalability reasons. In buyout, marginal underperformers may be more likely
to be shut out of future fundraising completely because the more successful buyout partnerships can
scale up to absorb the demand of investors. In contrast, even the most successful venture capital
partnerships can only deploy a relatively limited pool of capital eﬃctively, which limits the ability
of partnerships to leverage high returns into substantially larger future funds. We also conjecture
that the informativeness of returns is likely to be greater for buyout funds than for venture capital
funds, to the extent that if a venture fund outperforms, it is typically due to the success of a small
number of investments in the fund’s portfolio. It is generally more diﬃcult to tell skill from luck if
the bulk of returns are generated by a few extremely successful investments.
B. 2. Sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance in the sequence of funds
within a partnership
Holding θi ﬁxed, both p￿ (θi) s
τ+is and f￿ (θi) s
τ+is are decreasing in i because of the weighting term
s
τ+is. Intuitively, as partnerships progress through time, the partnership’s θ becomes known more
precisely, so that the optimal updating rule means that subsequent θsd on o tc h a n g ea sm u c h
as earlier θs for a given return. For this reason, it seems likely that both the sensitivity of the
probability of raising a follow-on fund to current performance and the sensitivity of follow-on size
to future performance are decreasing in fund sequence. The weighting term strictly decreases as the
numerator is s in each one, while the denominator increases with the sequence number. If p(.) or
f (.) is linear, the prediction is unambiguous. However, if p(.) or f (.) is convex and θi+1 > θi,o r
if p(.) or f (.) is concave and θi+1 < θi, the pattern may go the other way. That said, even if the
functions are highly nonlinear, on average we would not expect θi+1 to diﬀer much from θi,s oi t
seems likely that the weighting term eﬀect will dominate. Consequently, in the data we expect to
10Consistent with this logic is the fact that the most successful buyout funds such as KKR and Blackstone have
steadily increased the size of their funds to the point where the largest funds are between $15 and $20 billion in
committed capital, while the most successful Silicon Valley venture capitalists such as Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia
have remained at or under $1 billion in committed capital. Metrick and Yasuda (2010) also ﬁnd consistent evidence
examining the organizational structure of buyout partnerships compared to venture capital partnerships.
10observe a decreasing sensitivity of future fund size to current performance as a given partnership
manages subsequent funds.
C. Lifetime compensation of GPs
The total expected revenue earned by the GP over his lifetime is given by:




This formulation assumes that, following practice, GPs are compensated with a combination of
management fees, which are a function of committed capital, and carried interest, which is a function
of returns times the amount of capital in the fund. We think of the k(.) function as incorporating
these two elements, plus other fee income that is likely to be proportional to fund size. We assume
that the maximum number of funds the GP will ever run is N +1 . If the GP ever fails to raise a
follow-on fund, he earns no future income from managing private equity investments. For example,
income from the third fund is only obtained if a second fund is raised. Hence the expected revenue
from the third fund is a function of the probability that the third fund is raised conditional on
the assessment of ability following the second fund (which is given by p(θ2)) multiplied by the
probability that the second fund is raised (which is given by p(θ1)).
We are interested in calculating the magnitude of the pay-performance relation facing general
partners and decomposing it into the direct component, from carried interest in the current fund,
and the indirect component, from greater probability of raising future funds and greater future fund
size conditional on raising future funds. In other words, we are interested in calculating how much
of incremental proﬁts GPs expect to keep, and how much of this additional revenue comes in the
form of direct vs. indirect compensation.11
The pay-performance relation facing the GP is the sensitivity of total lifetime revenue to r1,
which is given by:
11We refer to revenue and compensation synonymously throughout the paper. In fact, private equity partnerships
do have some (but not many) costs that create a wedge between revenue and partner compensation. However, many
of these costs, such as the costs of renting an oﬃce and hiring support staﬀ,a r em o r eo rl e s sﬁ x e da n dd on o ta ﬀect
marginal compensation. In addition, our focus is on the indirect aspects of compensation and its size relative to
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The terms above have natural interpretations. The ﬁrst line in the expression above is the direct
eﬀect from carried interest in the current fund. This is the explicit component of the total pay-
performance relation facing the GP. The following lines give the implicit component. The second
line is the incremental expected revenue from the next fund. Intuitively, improving performance has
two eﬀects on incremental revenue from the next fund. The ﬁrst term in brackets represents the
increase in the probability that a follow-on fund will be raised multiplied by the size of the follow-on
fund conditional on one being raised. The second term in brackets represents the probability of
raising a follow-on multiplied by the increase in fund size conditional on one being raised. Similarly,
the third line is the incremental expected revenue from the third fund. The three components in
brackets represent, respectively, the increments to expected fund size from the increase in probability
of raising the second fund, the increase in probability of raising the third fund, and the increase
in size of the third fund. The weighting terms, of the form s
τ+is, represent the extent to which an
incremental change in r aﬀects the update of θ. These terms are declining in the sequence of returns
because the prior estimate of ability is more precise when more returns have been observed. The
k(.) terms outside the brackets represent the expected fraction of future fund sizes that accrues to
the GPs as revenue.
Our goal is to provide empirical estimates of the derivative ∂TR
∂r1 , and to compare the magnitude
of the ﬁrst term, which represents explicit pay for performance in the current fund, to that of the
sum of the following terms, which represent implicit pay for performance stemming from the eﬀect
of current performance on future fundraising.
12D. Empirical Implementation
We base our estimates of incremental expected revenue to the GPs from the current fund, k￿ (r1),
on the standard 2% management fee plus 20% carried interest fee structure. For the k(.) terms
for future funds, we use the estimates provided by Metrick and Yasuda (2010), who calculate via
simulation the expected fraction of a fund’s total committed capital (size) that accrues as revenue
to the GPs. For the p(.) and f (.) terms, we use the respective averages in our data sample:
the fraction of funds that raise a follow-on, and the average size of follow-on funds conditional
on raising a follow-on. Where appropriate, we compute these averages within fund type and/or
sequence number. We obtain estimates of the p￿ (θi) s
τ+is and f￿ (θi) s
τ+is terms using regressions
that estimate the sensitivities of, respectively, the probability of raising a follow-on fund, and the
size of the follow-on fund conditional on raising one, to current performance. We present the data
we use to obtain these estimates, and describe the estimation methodology in more detail, in the
the sections below. First, we discuss the generalizability of our framework to related settings.
E. Generalizing to other settings
An advantage of the theoretical framework outlined above is that it can be readily adapted to other
settings, notably other asset management applications, in which implicit pay for performance arises
from a relation between current performance and inﬂows of new investments, together with a com-
pensation structure that pays managers, at least in part, as a function of assets under management.
Both mutual funds and hedge funds share this feature with private equity in practice, and both are
settings in which implicit pay for performance is likely to be an important component of total pay
for performance.
A key diﬀerence between mutual funds and hedge funds compared to private equity is that the
former are typically open-ended, and so fundraising in these industries is in fact a continuous process,
and not a discrete event as in private equity. However, because the econometrician cannot observe
fund ﬂows continuously, the adaptations necessary to apply our framework to this case are modest.
To account for this diﬀerence in our framework, one could imagine a manager potentially managing
a fund for a some upper bound number of time periods (where the periodicity corresponds to the
unit of observation for fund ﬂows, e.g. years), and in each time period both ﬂows and the likelihood
13of being ﬁred are a function of past returns. Our learning setup, and the consequent decreasing
sensitivity of ﬂows to performance with age, seems appropriate for these settings as well.12
A complicating factor is that in these industries, unlike private equity, there is potentially an
important wedge between the compensation of the fund managers (even taken as a group) and
the fund management company. For example, while mutual fund companies receive a percentage
of assets under management as revenue and cannot be ﬁred except by a reduction of fund size to
zero, mutual fund managers themselves can be ﬁred, and little is known about their compensation
structure conditional on remaining employed.13 For these reasons, it may be easier to obtain reliable
estimates of the implicit pay for performance relation facing mutual fund companies rather than
the mutual fund managers themselves.
III. Data
To provide estimates of the total pay-performance relation facing private equity GPs, and the
relative magnitudes of its explicit and implicit components, we rely on fund-level data provided by
Preqin. We consider the three major types of private equity funds: buyout, venture capital, and real
estate. There are a total of 9,523 buyout, venture capital, and real estate funds in Preqin as of June
2009, which, according to Preqin, covers about 70% of all capital ever raised in the private equity
industry. In addition, in private communication Preqin informs us that about 85% of their data is
collected via Freedom of Information Act requests made to limited partners subject to the Act and
thereby is not subject to self-reporting biases. While we cannot independently verify these claims,
our data appear similar on key dimensions (notably performance) to that used in prior work.14
In all of our analysis, we exclude funds without vintage year data (64), without fund size
(committed capital) data (1,137), and which are still being raised (78). We begin by constructing
a sample of “preceding”, or current, funds. To obtain estimates of the sensitivities of the likelihood
of raising a follow-on fund, and the size of the follow-on conditional on raising one, to current
12Berk and Green (2004) present a model of mutual fund ﬂows based on learning.
13Chevalier and Ellison (1999) explore agency problems between mutual fund managers and mutual fund manage-
ment companies.
14In addition, any selection bias would likely oversample funds with good performance that do raise a follow-on
fund. This would have the eﬀect of downward-biasing our estimates of the relation between future fundraising and
current performance. In the extreme, if every fund in the data raises a follow-on, the relation between current
perforamance and ability to raise a follow-on fund is zero.
14performance, we require a sample of funds for which performance (IRR) data are available. From
this sample of funds, we follow Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and drop funds with less than $5m (in
1990 dollars) in committed capital, to reduce the inﬂuence of potentially extreme growth rates of
small funds on our results. In addition, to allow for suﬃcient time to ascertain whether a fund raises
a follow-on, we drop funds raised after 2005. Finally, when a private equity ﬁrm raises multiple
funds in a given year, we aggregate funds in that year and compute the fund size weighted IRR.
There are two exceptions to this. The ﬁrst is a few cases in which the same partnership manages,
say, both buyout and real estate funds. In those cases, we treat the partnership as two separate
partnerships, one each for buyout and real estate funds. We do so to ensure, for example, that a
real estate fund cannot be a follow-on fund to a buyout fund. The second (rare) exception is when
the same partnership manages funds of the same type but diﬀerent geographical focus, such as a
fund focusing on on European buyouts and another focusing on Asian buyouts. In this case, we
treat the European buyout funds and Asian buyout funds as two separate partnerships.
This sample construction leaves us with a ﬁnal sample of 1,745 preceding funds. The sample
consists of 645 (37%) buyout funds, 851 (49%) venture capital funds, and 249 (14%) real estate
funds. For each of these preceding funds, we ask whether we observe a follow-on fund in the
database. We deﬁne a follow-on fund as the next fund raised by the same partnership for which we
have information on fund size (we do not require information on the performance of the follow-on
fund). Thus each preceding fund is allowed to have at most one follow-on fund. If we observe a
follow-on fund raised by the end of our sample period (June 2009), we record the size of the follow-
on fund and compute the growth rate in fund size from the preceding fund to the follow-on fund.
If we do not observe a follow-on fund in the data, or if the data indicate follow-on funds but do
not provide size information, we treat this as if the partnership did not raise a follow-on fund. The
working assumption we use throughout the paper is that the absence of a follow-on fund with size
information in the data means the partnership was unable to raise one.15 Of the 1745 preceding
funds, 1469 (84.2%) raise a follow-on fund. By fund type, the breakdown is 549 of 645 buyout funds
(85.1%), 681 of 851 venture capital funds (80.0%), and 239 of 249 real estate funds (96.0%).
15This assumption has the eﬀect of downwardbiasing our estimates of the relation between current performance and
future fundraising. Undoubtedly some partnerships do raise follow-on funds that are missing from the data because
the data are incomplete. Additionally, in practice partnerships sometimes dissolve even though the market would
have been willing to provide capital for a follow-on fund had the partnership desired one.
15Table I presents descriptive statistics for this sample of preceding and follow-on funds. Panel A
reports that the sample represents 843 distinct partnerships: 314 buyout, 412 venture capital, and
117 real estate. The distribution of number of preceding funds per partnership is clearly skewed,
with many partnerships having just one or two preceding funds and a few substantially more (the
maximum in the sample is 12 preceding funds). Note that these are the numbers of preceding funds
used in our analysis, i.e., those that meet the data requirements described above, and therefore
understate the true number of funds per partnership.
Panel B of Table I reports descriptive statistics on preceding fund size and performance (IRR),
follow-on fund size and growth in size from preceding to follow-on funds, and the time elapsed
between successive fundraisings, i.e. the diﬀerence between the vintage years of the preceding and
follow-on funds. The latter three statistics are all conditional on raising a follow-on fund.
The mean (median) preceding fund size is $497.9 ($210.0) million for all funds taken together,
$866.4 ($380.0) million for buyout funds, $217.7 ($125.0) million for venture capital funds, and
$501.0 ($314.9) million for real estate funds. These distributions mirror the familiar facts that
buyout funds are typically larger than venture capital funds (with real estate in between), and that
the distribution of private equity fund size is right-skewed.
The mean (median) preceding fund performance is 15.1% (10.6%) for all funds taken together,
16.5% (14.3%) for buyout funds, 14.1% (5.8%) for venture capital funds, and 14.6% (14.1%) for real
estate funds. These numbers are similar to those in Kaplan and Schoar (2005), who report average
returns of 19% for buyout funds and 17% for venture capital funds (p. 1798). The similarity with
Kaplan and Schoar (2005), who use a diﬀerent data source (Venture Economics) and a diﬀerent
time period (their sample ends in 2001), is reassurance that our data do not suﬀer from important
biases missing from data used in prior work.
The mean (median) follow-on fund size, conditional on raising one, is $792.2 ($314.0) million
for all funds taken together, $1,465.3 ($632.6) million for buyout funds, $283.9 ($181.0) million for
venture capital funds, and $694.2 ($425.0) million for real estate funds. The mean (median) growth
in fund size from preceding to follow-on fund, conditional on raising a follow-on, is 92.4% (53.8%)
for all funds taken together, 110.9% (70.0%) for buyout funds, 78.6% (42.9%) for venture capital
funds, and 89.7% (48.9%) for real estate funds. These statistics show that follow-on funds are much
larger than preceding funds, and are suggestive of the importance of implicit pay for performance
16through future fundraising in private equity.
The time between successive fundraisings averages 3.3 years for the entire sample, 3.8 years for
buyout funds, 3.3 years for venture capital funds, and 2.4 years for real estate funds.
Table II reports the same fund characteristics broken out by the fund’s position in the partner-
ship’s sequence of funds. We compute a fund’s sequence number relative to all funds of a given
partnership in the Preqin database. Table II shows that higher sequence number funds are substan-
tially larger than lower sequence number funds, both because they represent successful partnerships
and also because they tend to be located later in time when funds were larger. The growth rate in
fund size from preceding to follow-on funds tends to decrease in the sequence of funds. Performance
generally increases in the sequence of funds, indicating that partnerships with good performance,
and for whom performance is more likely to persist, are more likely to raise follow-on funds. The
time between successive fundraisings generally decreases in the sequence of funds, suggesting that
older partnerships are more able to raise new funds on the basis of their past track records and
rely less on realized performance in the current fund to raise new funds. This is consistent with the
learning framework of Section II. Further consistent with this, the percentage of preceding funds
that raise a follow-on is generally increasing in the sequence of funds.
IV. The Empirical Relation between Current Performance and
Future Fundraising
In this section, we estimate the sensitivities of the probability of raising a follow-on fund, and
the sensitivity of the size of the follow-on fund conditional on raising one, to current performance.
In doing so, we have two goals. First, the regressions allow us to test the predictions developed in
Section II concerning variation in these sensitivities in the cross-section of funds and in the sequence
of funds within a partnership. Second, we use the regression coeﬃcients to obtain estimates of the
p￿ (θi) s
τ+is and f￿ (θi) s
τ+is terms in equation (3), which are necessary inputs to calculating the
magnitude of implicit pay for performance arising from the possibility of future fundraising.
17A. Base-case estimates of the sensitivity of future fundraising to current perfor-
mance
Table III reports estimates of the relation between future and current performance that do not
consider the possibility that the sensitivities can vary in the sequence of funds, as predicted by the
learning framework presented in Section II. As we discuss in more detail below, these estimates
provide a useful benchmark to assess the extent to which estimates of implicit pay for performance
in private equity (and likely in related settings) are overstated if the sensitivity of future fund ﬂows
to current performance is declining in partnership age.
In Table III, columns labeled “(1)” use the IRR of the “current” (preceding) fund as the sole
regressor, and columns labeled “(2)” contain vintage year (of the preceding fund) ﬁxed eﬀects to
control any market-wide, time-varying factors that potentially aﬀect the ability to raise a follow-on
fund, and to control for systematic diﬀerences in fund performance across diﬀerent vintage years.
These factors are likely to be important in light of the well-documented cyclicality of the private
equity market. In all speciﬁcations, we cluster standard errors at the partnership level, following
Kaplan and Schoar (2005). In addition, we estimate but to conserve space do not report regressions
using as the independent variable the preceding fund IRR minus the preceding fund’s benchmark
IRR provided by Preqin. Preqin deﬁnes the benchmark IRR as the average IRR of all funds of the
same type, vintage year, and geographic focus. Our results using this “risk-adjusted” measure of
IRR are virtually identical to those reported below.
Panel A of Table III presents marginal eﬀects, evaluated at the mean, from probit regressions
predicting the probability of raising a follow-on fund as a function of current (preceding) fund per-
formance (IRR). The relation between current performance and the likelihood of raising a follow-on
is economically and statistically signiﬁcantly positive for all funds taken as a whole (with fund type
dummies included), and for each type of fund (buyout, venture capital, and real estate) considered
separately. The point estimates from the speciﬁcations with vintage year ﬁxed eﬀects are slightly
larger than those from the speciﬁcations without, and the regressions have larger R2. In terms of
magnitude, the marginal eﬀects for the “All Funds” regressions imply that a one percentage point
improvement in IRR relative to the sample mean is associated with a 0.316-0.324 percentage point
increase in the probabilty of raising a follow-on fund. Consistent with scalability arguments and
18the theoretical framework of Section II, the estimated marginal eﬀects are larger for buyout funds
(0.467-0.588 percentage points) compared to venture capital funds (0.288-0.297 percentage points),
and the diﬀerences in the probit coeﬃcients between buyout funds and venture capital fundsare
statistically signiﬁcant.16 The diﬀerences between buyout and real estate, and between venture
capital and real estate, are not statistically signiﬁcant. In unreported analysis, we obtain similar
results using linear probability (i.e., OLS) models instead of probit. The estimated OLS coeﬃcients
are similar in magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance to the estimated marginal eﬀects at the mean
from the probit speciﬁcations.
Panel B of Table III presents OLS regressions predicting the growth in fund size from preceding to
follow-on fund as a function of IRR, for preceding funds that raise a follow-on fund. Growth in fund
size is deﬁned as follow-on fund size divided by preceding fund size minus one. The estimates indicate
that current performance is strongly positively related to follow-on fund size. The coeﬃcients are all
positive and are all statistically signiﬁcant except those for venture capital funds. The magnitudes
of the coeﬃcients in the “All Funds” regressions imply that a one percentage point increase in IRR
is associated with a 0.623-0.663 percentage point increase in fund growth. As in Panel A, the
estimated eﬀects for buyout funds (2.152 - 2.314 percentage points) are considerably larger than
those for venture capital funds (0.426-0.492 percentage points), with real estate in between (1.723-
1.955 percentage points). The diﬀerences between buyout and venture capital, and between real
estate and venture capital, and statistically signiﬁcant, while the diﬀerences between buyout and
real estate are not.
Panel C of Table III reports analogous regressions in which the dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of fund growth plus two, i.e. the natural logarithm of follow-on fund size divided by
preceding fund size plus one. (We add one to avoid taking the logarithm of a number close to
zero.) To the extent that the distribution of growth rates in the data is skewed (especially likely
for venture capital funds), a logarithmic speciﬁcation may ﬁt the data better. Consistent with this,
the R2 values in Panel C are generally considerably higher than those in Panel B. Once again, the
estimates indicate that current performance is strongly positively related to follow-on fund size.
The coeﬃcients are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant, and the estimated eﬀects for buyout
16Here and in all similar tests, we assess statistical signiﬁcance by pooling the observations of buyout and venture
capital funds into a single regression, and including an interaction of IRR with a dummy variable indicating fund
type (either). A signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the interaction term indicates a signiﬁcant diﬀerence across fund types.
19funds and real estate funds are signiﬁcantly larger than those for venture capital funds.
As an additional robustness check, in unreported analysis we repeat the analysis of Table III,
eliminating all preceding funds for which the time to next fundrasing is less than three years, and ﬁnd
similar results. Among other things, this adresses the possibility that some large fund companies
operate multiple types of funds simultaneously, such as one focusing on American buyouts and
another focusing on European ones. The performance of the American funds may be reﬂective of
the ability of the American partners and relatively uninformative about their European counterparts
(although to the extent tha ability is partnership-speciﬁc rather than person-speciﬁc, this is not of
concern). In this case, there are likely to be multiple fundraisings shortly after one another but the
reason for one being able to raise a large fund may have little relation to the performance of some
of the partnership’s other funds’ performance.
Overall, the evidence in Table III strongly supports the idea that implicit pay for performance
from the possibility of future fundraising is likely to be an important component of the total pay-
performance relation facing private equity GPs. Both the probability of raising a follow-on fund, and
the size of the follow-on conditional on raising one, are strongly positively related to the performance
of the current fund. In addition, these sensitivities are statistically and economically larger for
buyout funds (and to some extent real estate funds) compared to venture capital funds, consistent
with the idea that buyout is the most scalable and venture capital the least. In terms of the
theoretical framework in Section II, this result suggests that buyout funds have the largest p￿ (.)
and f￿ (.), and venture capital funds the least.
B. Sequence-speciﬁc estimates of the sensitivity of future fundraising to current
performance
The estimates presented in Table III do not consider the prediction of the learning-based framework
in Section II, that the sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance is declining in the
sequence of funds managed by a given partnership. To test this prediction, in Table IV we reestimate
the equations from Table III, including variables for the preceding fund’s sequence number as well as
the sequence number interacted with IRR. We present results from speciﬁcations using the preceding
fund’s IRR “(1)”, and the preceding fund’s IRR augmented by vintage year ﬁxed eﬀects “(2)”.17
17As in Table III, results are similar if we use the preceding fund’s benchmark-adjusted IRR.
20Panel A of Table IV presents regressions predicting the probability of raising a follow-on fund.
In Panel A, we focus on linear probability models because of the diﬃculty interpreting marginal
eﬀects of interaction terms in probit speciﬁcations (and the potential bias in coeﬃcient estimates
resulting from including ﬁxed eﬀects in probit speciﬁcations).18As in Table III, we ﬁnd that current
performance is positively related to the probability of raising a follow-on fund for all funds taken
together, for buyout funds, and for venture capital funds. The coeﬃcients are of similar magnitude
to those in Table III, and once again the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients for buyout and for
venture capital funds is statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on IRR for real estate funds is
similar to that in Table III, but is estimated less precisely and insigniﬁcant. For all funds, and
for buyout and venture capital funds individually, the coeﬃcient on sequence number is positive
and signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient on the interaction of sequence number with IRR is negative and
signiﬁcant (the coeﬃcients for real estate funds are insigniﬁcant). This pattern of coeﬃcients is
consistent with the learning framework of Section II. Higher sequence numbers are associated with
funds that have done well historically and hence have high current assessments of ability, so they
are more likely to raise a follow-on regardless of current performance, but ability is estimated more
precisely over time, so the marginal impact of current returns on ability to raise a follow-on fund
grows smaller over time.
Panel B of Table IV presents OLS regressions predicting growth in fund size conditional on
raising a follow-on fund, analogous to those of Panel B of Table III. The coeﬃcients on IRR are
positive, statistically signiﬁcant (with one exception), and generally larger in magnitude than those
in Panel B of Table III. The coeﬃcients on sequence number are all positive but not signiﬁcant.
With the exception of buyout funds, the coeﬃcients on the interaction of sequence number with
IRR are negative and signiﬁcant.
Panel C of Table IV presents analogous regressions in which the dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of growth in fund size plus two. As in Table III, the R2 values indicate that these
speciﬁcations ﬁt the data better than those of Panel B. The coeﬃcients on IRR are all positive,
statistically signiﬁcant, and larger in magnitude than those in Panel C of Table III. The coeﬃcients
on the interaction of sequence number with IRR are all negative and, with the exception of buyout
funds, statitically signiﬁcant. In both Panels B and C, the coeﬃcients indicate that the sensitivity
18See Ai and Norton (2003) and Greene (2000)
21of fund growth to performance is not signiﬁcantly greater for buyout funds compared to venture
capital funds for ﬁrst-time funds, but that the gap between grows quickly in the sequence of funds.
Overall, the evidence in Table IV supports the prediction of the learning-based framework in
Section II that the sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance is declining in the se-
quence of funds managed by a given partnership. For all fund types, either the sensitivity of the
probability of raising a follow-on fund to current performance is signiﬁcantly decreasing in sequence
number, or the sensitivity of growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow-on fund to current
performance is signiﬁcantly decreasing in sequence number. For all funds taken together, and for
venture capital funds indidvidually, both eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant. For buyout funds, the
eﬀect is signiﬁcant only through the probability of raising a follow-on, and for real estate, only
through the growth in follow-on fund size. Whether only one eﬀect is signiﬁcant or both, the im-
plication is that the sensitivity of expected follow-on fund size to current performance is declining
in the sequence of funds for all fund types.
We conjecture that similar patterns likely hold in the ﬂow-performance relations for other asset
mangement settings, in which learning is likely to play an important role in determining fund ﬂows,
such as mutual funds (e.g. Berk and Green, 2004) and hedge funds. In the mutual fund literature,
with the notable exception of Chevalier and Ellison (1997), the possibility that the sensitivity of
ﬂows to performance depends on fund age is generally ignored.
C. Measurement issues
In all of the regressions presented in this section, we use the ﬁnal or ultimate IRR of the fund as the
measure of the fund’s performance. A concern with doing so is that a fund’s ultimate performance
is not known with certainty at the time the next fund is raised. The summary statistics presented
in Table I show that the typical fund that raises a follow-on does so after 3 years of life, while ﬁnal
performance is not known until the end of the partnership’s life. The key question is whether ﬁnal,
ex post IRR is a reasonable proxy for the information about performance that a fund’s investors
use in deciding whether and how much capital to allocate to a partnership’s next fund. There are
several reasons to believe that the answer is “yes”.
First, Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) present a model in which a fund’s
current investors have soft information about the likely proﬁtability of a fund’s investments (ob-
22tained, for example, from close communication with the GPs), and use it when deciding whether to
allocate capital to the partnership’s next fund. This soft information about performance is not re-
ﬂected in the hard information about performance, “interim IRR”, available at that time, and is not
observable to the econometrician. This soft information becomes observable to the econometrician
only ex post, as it is reﬂected in the fund’s ﬁnal IRR. They ﬁnd supporting evidence for this idea
in that the performance of the follow-on fund (if one is raised) is strongly correlated with the ﬁrst
fund’s ﬁnal IRR, but uncorrelated with the interim IRR that was available at the time the follow-on
was raised. Given this, it seems likely that a fund’s ﬁnal IRR is, if anything, a better proxy than its
interim IRR for the information about performance investors in deciding whether to allocate capital
to the partnership’s next fund. Second, even if the interim IRR is the more desirable measure, to
the extent that it is imperfectly correlated with ﬁnal IRR, the standard errors-in-variables prob-
lem implies that our estimates will understate the sensitivity of future fundraising to performance.
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) provide evidence that interim IRR (at 5 years) and ﬁnal IRR are highly
correlated, with correlation coeﬃcients of about 0.90, consistent with the ﬁrst few exits (or, in the
case of venture capital, follow-on investments in portfolio companies) being strongly indicative of a
fund’s ultimate performance.
Notwithstanding these arguments, in the Appendix we present regressions analogous to those
in this section, but in which we use the interim IRR at time of fundraising as our measure of fund
performance. While we have interim IRR data for only somewhat less than half of our sample funds,
we obtain similar results to those presented in this section.
V. Estimating Pay for Performance
In this section, we use the theoretical framework discussed in Section II, together with the regression
estimates presented in Section IV, to estimate the magnitude of the total pay for performance
relation facing private equity GPs, and to compare the magnitudes of its explicit and implicit
components. We consider two measures of pay for performance: the incremental revenue to GPs
for an incremental dollar returned to LPs, and the incremental revenue to GPs for an incremental
percentage point improvement in IRR.
23A. Explicit (direct) pay for performance
We begin by estimating explicit pay for performance, or the change in revenue from the current
fund the GP earns from an incremental improvement in performance. This is represented by the
ﬁrst term in equation (3) in Section II. We do this assuming the standard 20% carry, and that
the baseline level of performance and fund size to which the increment is applied are equal to the
relevant means in our sample (by type and sequence). The ﬁrst two rows of Panel A of Table V
display the relevant sample means for ﬁrst-time funds. For all fund types, the baseline level of
performance is positive (and greater than a potential hurdle rate of 8%), so the carry is in the
money. The incremental revenue in the current fund to GPs for an incremental dollar returned to
LPs is then $0.25.19 This is the metric emphasized by Jensen and Murphy (1990) in the context of
CEOs of public companies.
To calculate the incremental revenue to GPs for an incremental percentage point improvement
in IRR, it is necessary to make further assumptions. The IRR is an annualized return measure
which has well-known problems such as the implicit assumption that intermediate distributions
are reinvested at the IRR. To make things as simple as possible, and because our data are not
suﬃcient to make more accurate calculations, we assume that all capital is called at once and all
distributions are made at once. That is, we assume that each fund has a single capital call and a
single distribution, and the time (denoted T) between the two matches the typical length of time
in the data between the call of a dollar and the return of the proﬁts associated with investing that
dollar, which we take to be 3 years.
Under these assumptions, the total dollar return to limited partners in the ﬁrst fund, D,i s
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This formula can be used to convert incremental revenue per extra dollar returned to LPs to
incremental revenue per incremental percentage point of IRR, and vice versa.
Panel A of Table V displays the incremental revenue to GPs from extra carried interest in
the current fund that arises from an incremental perncentage point improvement in IRR, calculated
using this formula (with ∂R
∂D =0 .25) and the displayed sample parameters. For the average ﬁrst-time
fund in our sample (size $262.3 million), improving IRR from a baseline of 15.75% to 16.75% results
in $2.659 million in incremental revenue to the GP, or $2.297 million in present value using a discount
rate of 5% (applied for three years, the assumed cash in/cash out time interval).20 For buyout funds
the present value is larger, $3.749 million, reﬂecting both the larger average size of buyout funds
and the higher baseline level of performance (because of compounding, a given increment to returns
has a larger eﬀect with a larger baseline). The present value for venture capital funds is the smallest
($1.054 million), and real estate funds fall in the middle ($2.991 million). Again, for all fund types,
the incremental revenue to GPs for an incremental dollar returned to LPs is $0.25, or $0.216 in
present value (discounted at 5% for three years).
B. Implicit (indirect) pay for performance
We now turn to estimating implicit pay for performance arising from the eﬀect of current perfor-
mance on future fundraising. This eﬀect corresponds to the second and above lines in equation (3)
of Section II. This equation allows us to interpret our econometric estimates as estimates of the
magnitude of implicit pay for performance in private equity. We perform this calcluation both in
absolute terms and relative to the direct pay for performance oﬀered by the carried interest in the
current fund, and and also consider how the magnitudes vary across fund type and sequence.
To estimate the terms equation (3) of Section II, we require estimates of the k(.) terms, the p(.)
and f (.) terms, and the p￿ (.) s
τ+is and f￿ (.) s
τ+is terms. A key component of our calculation are the
k(.) terms, deﬁned as the expected fraction of a fund’s size (committed capital) that accrues to GPs
as compensation, through a combination of mangement fees and carried interest. The appropriate
20We use a discount rate of 5% for consistency with Metrick and Yasuda (2010), because we rely on their estimates,
which they obtain using a discount rate of 5%, to calculate implicit pay for performance in the sections below.
25values for k(.)are not obvious, and depend on the fee structure as well as the entire distribution of
returns, which matters because it aﬀects the likelihood of the carried interest being “in the money”
and the amount that it will be worth conditional on being in the money. Our analysis relies on the
work of Metrick and Yasuda (2010), who perform Monte Carlo simulations to estimate k(.) using
details of the compensation structure in the partnership agreements of venture capital and buyout
partnerships as well as data on the distribution of fund returns. Metrick and Yasuda (2010) provide
estimates of the distribution of k(.) for venture capital and buyout funds, and we use similar values
for real estate funds (not considered by Metrick and Yasuda) and the overall sample of funds.
For the p(.) and f (.) terms, we use the type- and sequence-speciﬁc averages in our sample.
For example, suppose the current fund is a ﬁrst-time buyout fund. Then p(θ1) is the fraction of
preceding buyout funds of sequence number 1 that raise a follow-on fund in our sample. Panel F of
Table II reports that this value equals to 76.5%. f (θ1) is the average size of follow-on funds raised
by preceding buyout funds of sequence number 1 (conditional on raising a follow-on fund). Panel
C of Table II reports that this is equal to $685.7 million. In this way, all of the p(.) and f (.) terms
used in our calculations are provided in Table II.
It remains to obtain estimates of the p￿ (.) s
τ+is and f￿ (.) s
τ+is terms from the regression coeﬃ-
cients in Tables III and IV. In all of our calculations, we use the coeﬃcients from the speciﬁcations
without vintage year, because they are generally more conservative than those from the speciﬁcaitons
with vintage year.
We begin by obtaining estimates of these terms using the coeﬃcients from Table III (which
ignore sequence interactions). The marginal eﬀects from the probit regressions in Panel A are
estimates of the change in probability of raising a follow-on fund for an incremental change in
current performance, and so are direct estimates of p￿ (.) s
τ+is, in which the constraint is imposed
that the estimate is the same for all i, i.e., sequence is ignored.
Because a comparison of Panels B and C of Table III indicates that a logarithmic speciﬁcation
for follow-on fund size ﬁts the data better, we use the coeﬃcients from Panel C to obtain estimates
of the f￿ (.) s
τ+is terms.21 In the regressions in Panel C, the dependent variable is the natural






21In doing so, we are conservative. Our estimates of implicit pay for performance are higher, generally by about
10%, if we use the raw growth speciﬁcation coeﬃcients instead.
26estimated regression coeﬃcient, β, is an estimate of the derivative of this quantity with respect




τ+is . Rearranging, we have
f￿ (θi) s
τ+is = β (f (θi−1)+f (θi)). As described above, we estimate the f (.) terms using the type-
and sequence-speciﬁc averages for preceding and follow-on funds in our sample. Note that even
though the coeﬃcient β is constrained to be the same across sequence number in these speciﬁcations,
the estimates of f￿ (.) s
τ+is will diﬀer with sequence number because of the diﬀering f (.) terms.
Continuing the example of the ﬁrst-time buyout fund, the expected incremental compensation
from the next (ﬁrst follow-on) fund is given in equation (3) as k(r2)[p￿ (θ1)f (θ1)+p(θ1)f￿ (θ1)] s
τ+s.
Metrick and Yasuda (2010) estimate an average k(.) for buyout funds of 17.72%. The marginal
eﬀect in Panel A of Table III for a one-percentage point increment in IRR is equal to 0.00467
(in the regression, IRR is expressed as a decimal rather than a percentage), and the coeﬃcient
from Panel C of Table III (again, converting decimal to percentage) is equal to 0.00524. As de-
scribed above, p(θ1) =7 6 . 5 %a n df (θ1) = $685.7 million. Panel A of Table II reports that the
average size of preceding buyout funds of sequence number 1 in our sample is f (θ0) =$ 4 1 7 . 5
million. Putting it all together, the incremental expected compensation from the next (second)
fund for a one-percentage point improvement in IRR in the current fund is equal to 0.1772 ∗
[0.00467 ∗ 685.7+0 .765 ∗ 0.00524 ∗ (685.7 + 417.5)], or $1.351 million. This ﬁgure is the present
value as of the beginning of the life of the second fund (this is how Metrick and Yasuda compute
k(.)), so to convert to present value as of the beginning of the current fund requires discounting at
our discount rate (5%) for the average number of years elapsed between fundraisings (approximately
3 years in our data).
In this way, we calculate the expected incremental compensation from the second, third, etc.
follow-on funds following equation (3) of Section II, discounting each appropriately at 5% assuming
a 3 year gap between successive fundraisings. We then add the discounted expected incremental
compensation from each future fund to arrive at the total estimated implicit pay for performance.
We ﬁrst perform the calculations as described above, using the coeﬃcients from Table III that ignore
sequence interactions. We then repeat the calculations using the analogous coeﬃcients from Table
IV, that account for sequence interactions. The only change in the calculation described above is
that, wherever we previously used a coeﬃcient from Table III, we instead use the corresponding level
27eﬀect coeﬃcient plus the product of the coeﬃcient on the sequence interaction and the sequence
number of the preceding fund, all from Table IV. For example, when calculating the incremental
compensation from the second follow-on fund (third fund overall) for buyout funds, the estimate of
p￿ (θ2) s
τ+2s is given by (from Panel A of Table IV) 0.698 − 0.091 ∗ 2=0 .516.
B.1. Estimates ignoring sequence eﬀects
Panel B of Table V displays estimates of the implicit pay-performance relation facing private eq-
uity GPs, calculated using the coeﬃcients from Table III (which ignore sequence eﬀects) and the
methodology described above. In Table V, we focus on ﬁrst-time funds. We present results for all
funds taken together, and for each fund type individually. We present results for diﬀerent values
of k(.). For buyout funds, we use 15.75%, 17.72%, and 19.60%, which are, respectively, the 25th,
50th (median), and 75th percentiles calculated by Metrick and Yasuda (2010). For venture capital
funds, the corresponding numbers calculated by Metrick and Yasuda (2010) are 20.24%, 22.84%,
and 26.11%. The numbers for venture capital funds are higher because of the higher volatility of
venture investments compared to buyout, which increases the value of the option on the investment
portfolio implied by the carried interest. For all funds taken together and for real estate funds, we
use 15%, 20%, and 25%. As shown in equation (3) in Section II, all of the estimates are linear in
k(.).
We also present results for diﬀerent values of N, which as explained in Section II has the inter-
pretation of the maximum number of funds the GP could potentially run (e.g., before retirement).
Recall also that the thereotical framework in Section II incorporates the realistic feature that failure
to raise a follow-on is a once and for all event (i.e., dropping out is permanent), and the formula
for expected incremental GP compensation (equation (3)), and hence our resulting estimates, takes
this into account.
In the columns labeled δTR/δIRR, we present estimates of the present value (at 5%) of the
expected incremental revenue from furture funds resulting a one percentage point improvement
in current fund IRR, and in the columns labeled δTR/δD we convert these estimates into those
resulting from a extra dollar returned to LPs using the formula (and the same assumptions) as in
Section V. A., above. A convenient way of characterizing this eﬀect is to take the ratio of these
indirect incentives to the direct incentives from the carried interest in the current fund. This ratio
28is the same whether the performance measure is IRR or dollars (because the term in brackets in
equation (4) drops out when taking the ratio). We present these ratios in the rightmost columns of
Panel B of Table V.
It is evident from Panel B of Table V that implicit pay for performance from future fundraising
is important in the private equity industry. The ratios reported in Panel B suggest that implicit pay
for performance is at a minimum of the same order of magnitude as explicit pay for performance.
The ratios range from a low of 0.563 for venture capital funds with N =3and k = 20.24% to a
high of 4.113 for buyout funds with N =5and k = 19.60%.
The variation in the magnitude of implicit pay for performance across diﬀerent types of funds is
consistent with the scalability arguments of Section II and the regression results of Tables III and
IV. Implicit pay for performance is largest for buyout funds and smallest for venture capital funds,
both in absolute terms and relative to explicit pay for performance.
Another way to view these results is to add explicit and implicit performance to obtain an
estimate of total pay for performance for private equity general partners. Recall that under our
assumptions, given that the carry is in the money, the discounted direct eﬀect on GP compensation
on returning an extra $1 to LPs is $0.216. To this we can add the numbers from the columns labeled
δTR/δD, which range from $0.213 to $0.896, to obtain a total discounted change in GP wealth per
extra (undiscounted) dollar returned to LPs ranging from $0.429 to $1.102, which by any metric is
a strong pay-performance relation, and is at least two orders of magnitude larger than the $0.00325
estimated by Jensen and Murphy (1990) for public company CEOs.
B.2. Estimates accounting for sequence eﬀects
The estimates presented in Tables III and IV suggest that the implicit incentives calculated in
Table V could potetially be aﬀected by the declining sensitivity of future fundraising to current
performance in the sequence of a partnership’s funds. This implication comes directly from the
learning framework presented in Section II, and the estimates presented in Table IV suggest that
the magnitude of this eﬀect is likely to be substantial.
In Table VI we consider the quantitative importance of this eﬀect by estimating the implicit pay-
performance relation facing private equity GPs, calculated using the approach described in Section
V. B. above, and coeﬃcients from Table IV (which take sequence eﬀects into account) rather than
29those from Table III (which do not).
There are two channels through which sequence eﬀects are likely to be important. First, holding
the sequence number of the “current” fund ﬁxed, there is relatively less value from each potential
subsequent funds, and hence relatively less value from increasing N. Second, as a partnership ages
(the current fund becomes more advanced in the sequence of the partnership’s funds), current per-
formance will have less of an impact on the market’s assessment of ability, and so future fundraising
will be less sensitive to it.
The pay-for-performance relations presented in Table VI strongly support these ideas. In Panel
A, we calculate the (discounted) direct eﬀect or explicit pay for performance for diﬀerent sequence
number current funds. The eﬀects per incremental dollar returned to LPs are the same ($0.25
undiscounted, $0.216 discounted), but the eﬀect per incremental percentage point of IRR grows
with fund sequence reﬂecting the growth in fund size with sequence.
In Panel B of Table VI, we estimate implicit pay for performance, holding k() ﬁxed at its
median values from Table V (as before all estimates are linear in k()). Two patterns are evident.
The estimates are smaller than their counterparts in Table V, and decline rapidly with the sequence
number of the current fund. The decline is fairly eﬀects weak for buyout funds and very strong for
venture capital funds. Figure 1 depicts these patterns graphically. For all funds taken together and
for venture capital funds, implicit pay for performance declines to virtually zero by the time the
partnership is managing its fourth fund, leaving only the explicit component.
While smaller than the estimates in Table V, the estimates for ﬁrst-time current funds in par-
ticular are still quite large and of the same order of magnitude as direct eﬀects from the current
fund, with ratios of implicit to explicit pay for performance ranging from a low of 0.484 for venture
capital funds with N =3to a high of 3.015 for buyout funds with N =5 . The estimates for second
and third “current” funds are smaller but still substantial, and for buyout funds implicit pay for
performance remains important well into a partnership’s sequence of funds.
The rapid decline for venture capital funds in particular helps understand the ﬁndings in Gom-
pers and Lerner (1999) that successful venture capital partnerships sometimes raise their carry
percentages in future funds (typically to 25% or 30% from 20%). Gibbons and Murphy (1992)
argue that optimal explicit pay for performance should increase when implicit, market-driven pay
for performance decreases (e.g., as a person ages). However, the magnitude of the decline in implicit
30pay for performance is much too large to be oﬀset by an increase in carry to 25% or even 30%, and
so our estimates imply that total pay for performance declines over a partnership’s life. The extent
to which this compensation system is eﬃcient is an interesting question for future research.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
In the private equity industry, the possibility of future fundraising can provide substantial incentives
to general partners above and beyond the much-discussed incentives from the explicit compensation
system. Partnerships establish a reputation for being able to generate returns early in their careers,
which can be lucrative later on as it allows partners to earn fees on larger funds subsequently. We
present a learning framework that characterizes this process. We then provide estimates of the
relation between current fund performance and future fundraising that allow us to estimate the size
of the implicit pay for performance relation facing private equity general partners. Our estimates
suggest that the implicit component of pay for performance is of the same order of magnitude
as the explicit component from carried interest that has been commonly credited with much of
the value creation in private equity. Implicit pay for performance, and the resulting incentives,
are particularly important for newer partnerships who have yet to establish a reputation, and for
younger partnerships who have the potential to reap the beneﬁts of the reputation for a longer
period of time.
Clearly there are a number of measurement issues that aﬀect the interpretation of the results.
Throughout the paper, our assumptions are intended to be realistic, and wherever possible, con-
servative. If anything, our conclusion that the implicit component of total pay for performance is
approximately the same size as the explicit component likely understates its true importance. The
calculation of the direct eﬀect is likely an overestimate, as it assumes that general partners keep
20% of each incremental dollar while in fact they get less than that in expectation. In contrast, the
calculation of the indirect eﬀect ignores the possibility that individual partners can use their per-
sonal reputations to raise new funds on their own, or join other existing ﬁrms for lucrative salaries.
These possibilities, which do occur fairly regularly, are examples of valuable reputational capital
acquired by general partners through earning high returns that the formal analysis in this paper
does not consider.
31This paper contributes to the debate about the incentives of private equity managers and their
eﬀect on value creation. Metrick and Yasuda (2010) ﬁnd that roughly two-thirds of the compensation
in private equity partnerships comes from ﬁxed rather than variable components of compensation.
Our results suggest that their calculations understate the total incentive compensation that general
partners have, and that performance-based compensation in private equity partnerships is larger
than previously thought.
The analysis in this paper could be applied to other forms of organization. Perhaps the most
straighforward would be to other asset management settings, because the explicit fee structures in
this industry allow for straightforward calculation of the returns to managing a larger quantity of
funds. Hedge funds have a somewhat diﬀerent institutional structure than private equity funds with
their inﬁnite lives and their compensation system based on the “high-water mark”. Nonetheless, it
should be possible to adapt our framework to perform similar calculations for hedge funds as we
do for private equity funds. In addition, mutual funds, pension funds, and private management
of institutional capital, although with a diﬀerent fee structure, similarly exhibit a relation between
current performance and subsequent inﬂows of new investment. Calculating the incentives implicit in
the ﬂow-performance relations in these settings would be an important addition to our understanding
of these industries.
Most generally, our analysis provides some empirical content to the idea started by Fama (1980)
and Holmstrom (1982, 1999) that implicit pay for performance can be an important source of
incentives inside ﬁrms. Holmstrom in particular argues that in an intertemporal setting, agents will
take actions to maximize people’s perception of their abilities, which can but do not necessarily
coincide with increasing a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability. The advantage of focusing on the private equity
setting as we do here is that it is possible to quantify the long-term pecuniary beneﬁts to agents
from these perceptions. Private equity is nonetheless an industry where incentives, both direct
and indirect, are particularly important. The extent to which indirect, market-based incentives are
important in other industries, both in absolute terms and relative to direct incentives, is likely to
be an important topic of future research.
32Appendix
In this Appendix, we present regressions predicting future fundraising as a function of a fund’s
interim, as opposed to ﬁnal, IRR (see the discussion in Section IV. A.). Preqin provides interim
IRR data for a subset of our main sample of preceding funds, but the time-series of interim IRRs for
a given fund is almost always incomplete (so it is not possible for us to use these data to estimate,
for example, hazard models to predict future fundraising). Similarly, Preqin provides cash ﬂow data
for another (partially overlapping) subset, making it possible for us to compute interim IRRs, but
the cash ﬂow data for a given fund generally appear to be incomplete. Using these two sources
of interim IRR data, we obtain interim IRR at the time of next fundraising for 801 of our 1,745
preceding funds (using the Preqin interim IRR when both are available because the cash ﬂow data
are often incomplete) . For preceding funds that do not raise a follow-on fund, we use the interim
IRR after 3 years of life, matching the average time between successive fundraisings in our data.
Panel A of Table A-I shows that the correlation between this interim IRR for a fund and the
fund’s ﬁnal IRR is high. The correlation is 0.607 for all funds taken together, 0.551 for buyout
funds, 0.618 for venture capital funds, and 0.228 for real estate funds. In Panel B we estimate
probit regressions to explain whether a follow-on fund is raised, analogous to Panel A of Table
III. The estimated marginal eﬀects are all positive and signiﬁcant with the exception of real estate
funds. For all fund types, the diﬀerence between the marginal eﬀects reported in Panel B of Table
A-I and those reported in Panel A of Table III are statistically insigniﬁcant. In Panel C of Table A-I
we estimate regressions predicting (log) fund growth from preceding to follow-on fund, analogous
to those reported in Panel C of Table III. Again, all of the estimated coeﬃcients are positive, all
are signiﬁcant except for buyout funds which narrowly miss signiﬁcance, and none are statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the analogous coeﬃcients reported in Panel C of Table III.
Overall, the evidence presented in Table A-I suggests that, even if interim IRR were the right way
for the econometrican to summarize the information set used by investors in assessing performance
at the time of next fundraising (which is questionable, see the discussion in Section IV. A.), our
results are unlikely to be materially biased by using the fund’s ﬁnal IRR instead, and by doing so
we gain the advantage of a substantially greater number of observations and enhanced statistical
power.
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35Mean Median Std Dev Min. Q1 Q3 Max.
All 843 2.07 1 1.65 1 1 3 12
Buyout 314 2.05 1.00 1.56 1.00 1.00 3.00 11.00
Venture Capital 412 2.07 1.00 1.75 1.00 1.00 2.00 12.00
Real Estate 117 2.13 2.00 1.47 1.00 1.00 3.00 9.00
Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3
Preceding fund size ($M) 1745 497.9 210.0 82.4 500.0
Preceding fund performance (IRR) 1745 15.1% 10.6% 0.5% 22.3%
Follow-on fund size conditional on raising one ($M) 1469 792.2 314.0 136.0 728.4
Growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow-on (%) 1469 92.4% 53.8% 0.0% 123.1%
Time between successive funds (years) 1469 3.3 3.0 2.0 4.0
Percentage of preceding funds that raise a follow-on 84.2%
Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3
Preceding fund size ($M) 645 866.4 380.0 169.2 900.0
Preceding fund performance (IRR) 645 16.5% 14.3% 5.9% 25.4%
Follow-on fund size conditional on raising one ($M) 549 1465.3 632.6 289.3 1500.0
Growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow-on (%) 549 110.9% 70.0% 21.7% 140.3%
Time between successive funds (years) 549 3.8 3.0 2.0 5.0
Percentage of preceding funds that raise a follow-on 85.1%
Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3
Preceding fund size ($M) 851 217.7 125.0 56.0 254.0
Preceding fund performance (IRR) 851 14.1% 5.8% -5.0% 17.6%
Follow-on fund size conditional on raising one ($M) 681 283.9 181.0 80.0 368.0
Growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow-on (%) 681 78.6% 42.9% -8.3% 113.6%
Time between successive funds (years) 681 3.3 3.0 2.0 4.0
Percentage of preceding funds that raise a follow-on 80.0%
Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3
Preceding fund size ($M) 249 501.0 314.9 106.0 622.8
Preceding fund performance (IRR) 249 14.6% 14.1% 7.9% 21.9%
Follow-on fund size conditional on raising one ($M) 239 694.2 425.0 145.0 817.3
Growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow-on (%) 239 89.7% 48.9% -3.6% 100.6%
Time between successive funds (years) 239 2.4 2.0 1.0 3.0
Percentage of preceding funds that raise a follow-on 96.0%
Venture Capital
Real Estate
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the number of preceding funds per partnership




Descriptive statistics for the sample funds. Panel A reports the distribution of the number of preceding funds per partnership. Panel B reports the
distributions of preceding fund size and performance,follow-on fund size conditional on raising a follow-on, growth in fund size conditional on
raising a follow-on (percentage difference between preceding and follow-on size), the time between successive funds (the time elapsed before
raising a follow-on), and the percentage of preceding funds that raise a follow-on. Preceding funds meet the following criteria: fund size and
performance (IRR) information is available, fund size is at least $5M in 1990 dollars, and the fund is raised before 2006. The follow-on fund for




Number of preceding funds per partnership
All FundsSequence Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3
1 612 262.3 112.0 50.0 271.0 247 417.5 220.0 100.0 500.0 290 124.0 75.0 38.7 150.0 75 286.4 202.0 50.0 386.0
2 392 362.9 187.5 75.0 417.0 147 587.8 357.0 165.0 700.0 192 169.9 106.0 54.9 218.5 53 438.0 273.9 126.0 600.0
3 271 488.2 250.0 109.7 518.0 101 812.5 469.0 220.0 900.0 127 216.3 140.0 65.6 279.0 43 530.0 387.1 119.1 831.0
4 186 723.2 355.0 151.0 825.0 65 1397.5 825.0 400.0 1902.0 87 264.6 176.0 100.0 300.0 34 607.7 518.9 225.0 830.0
5 109 861.4 312.5 148.0 750.0 35 1807.4 750.0 331.5 2100.0 52 258.7 169.0 101.5 295.0 22 781.0 509.5 290.0 950.0
6 68 897.2 481.0 202.0 829.0 17 1978.0 1000.0 604.2 3496.9 38 350.3 247.0 170.0 505.0 13 1082.3 567.0 475.0 1000.0
7 41 921.7 444.0 238.0 917.0 11 2041.7 1425.7 470.0 3200.0 23 439.8 300.0 225.0 450.0 7 744.8 570.0 168.0 917.0
8 24 1265.3 787.5 345.5 1868.5 10 2354.4 1950.0 1324.8 3000.0 13 518.5 500.0 311.0 750.0 1 82.0 82.0 82.0 82.0
9 18 2184.3 900.0 305.0 3781.0 7 4483.4 5000.0 3085.0 5300.0 10 787.0 583.0 159.6 1000.0 1 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0
>=10 24 1536.3 848.9 400.5 1558.0 5 4427.9 5426.1 3272.0 5941.5 19 775.3 526.8 290.0 1100.0
Total 1745 497.9 210.0 82.4 500.0 645 866.4 380.0 169.2 900.0 851 217.7 125.0 56.0 254.0 249 501.0 314.9 106.0 622.8
Sequence Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3
1 612 15.8% 12.2% 3.0% 22.4% 247 17.2% 16.5% 7.2% 26.5% 290 14.0% 8.0% -1.6% 17.4% 75 17.5% 15.8% 10.9% 24.8%
2 392 13.5% 9.6% -0.4% 22.1% 147 16.8% 13.9% 4.6% 24.6% 192 10.6% 5.0% -4.9% 16.5% 53 14.6% 14.1% 8.2% 23.0%
3 271 12.4% 10.3% 0.1% 22.3% 101 15.6% 12.9% 4.2% 25.3% 127 10.1% 4.0% -6.9% 19.9% 43 11.6% 12.0% 6.9% 18.3%
4 186 19.1% 10.5% -0.6% 21.1% 65 13.3% 11.9% 4.5% 21.1% 87 26.1% 2.9% -7.2% 20.6% 34 12.2% 13.6% 6.3% 21.0%
5 109 15.3% 10.0% -2.2% 26.0% 35 17.5% 12.4% 4.1% 33.2% 52 14.2% 5.6% -8.6% 21.0% 22 14.6% 13.0% 7.7% 17.7%
6 68 19.6% 9.7% -2.5% 25.5% 17 16.8% 14.7% 8.9% 23.4% 38 22.5% 2.6% -5.2% 29.9% 13 15.0% 12.3% 5.6% 25.4%
7 41 16.6% 10.3% -2.5% 17.9% 11 20.6% 17.9% 10.3% 35.3% 23 16.8% 1.6% -6.9% 10.4% 7 9.6% 11.6% 5.8% 16.0%
8 24 17.7% 12.2% -2.5% 40.8% 10 24.6% 21.0% 11.7% 48.8% 13 12.1% 1.1% -8.5% 16.5% 1 21.5% 21.5% 21.5% 21.5%
9 18 9.9% 6.4% 1.5% 22.8% 7 10.1% 8.8% 1.5% 22.8% 10 7.2% 2.2% -1.0% 13.4% 1 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0%
>=10 24 7.2% 1.1% -4.9% 20.4% 5 0.7% -2.1% -7.9% 13.4% 19 8.9% 1.2% -2.7% 25.1%
Total 1745 15.1% 10.6% 0.5% 22.3% 645 16.5% 14.3% 5.9% 25.4% 851 14.1% 5.8% -5.0% 17.6% 249 14.6% 14.1% 7.9% 21.9%
Sequence Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3
2 462 422.7 215.9 90.0 472.0 189 685.7 390.4 180.0 767.0 201 175.3 114.2 57.2 225.0 72 422.6 304.6 100.0 675.1
3 347 557.6 279.0 116.0 600.0 130 978.8 540.3 252.0 1000.0 167 232.3 154.0 73.0 318.0 50 549.2 326.4 150.0 772.2
4 231 772.2 404.0 165.0 855.7 89 1380.6 850.0 405.0 1550.0 101 273.4 191.0 116.1 375.0 41 680.2 537.9 145.0 846.0
5 163 1039.7 380.0 154.3 900.0 58 2070.4 855.0 392.0 2996.9 72 295.4 199.5 104.0 412.0 33 852.0 530.0 290.0 950.0
6 100 1543.2 474.1 223.5 950.0 34 3505.4 1326.0 473.3 5125.0 44 360.9 247.0 172.5 527.5 22 875.2 506.5 340.0 900.0
7 66 1030.3 464.2 252.9 917.0 17 1777.6 682.6 500.0 3100.0 36 442.4 315.0 234.0 469.2 13 1681.2 707.5 498.0 1325.0
8 38 1658.0 735.0 315.0 1500.0 11 3763.4 1900.0 1170.0 3000.0 21 517.0 400.0 300.0 750.0 6 1791.7 1065.0 594.0 1994.0
9 23 1846.6 800.0 400.0 3085.0 10 3599.6 3433.0 1300.0 5150.3 12 534.3 480.0 232.3 703.0 1 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0
10 16 1800.3 760.5 237.1 3386.0 6 3985.6 3600.0 3272.0 5941.5 9 533.0 470.7 226.4 650.0 1 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0
>=11 23 3064.8 1100.0 290.0 2560.0 5 10789.5 12179.5 5426.1 15000.0 18 919.1 691.3 102.5 1450.0
Total 1469 792.2 314.0 136.0 728.4 549 1465.3 632.6 289.3 1500.0 681 283.9 181.0 80.0 368.0 239 694.2 425.0 145.0 817.3
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real Estate
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for preceding fund performance (IRR)
Table II
Descriptive Statistics by Fund Sequence
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for preceding fund size ($M)
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for follow-on fund size conditional on raising a follow-on ($M)
Descriptive statistics by preceding and follow-on fund sequence number. Panel A presents statistics for preceding fund size. Panel B presents statistics for preceding fund performance (IRR).
Panel C presents statistics for follow-on size conditional on raising a follow-on. Panel D reports statistics for growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow on (in percent). Panel E reports
statistics for the number of years elapsed between successive fundraisings, conditional on raising a follow-on. Panel F reports the percentage of preceding funds that raise a follow-on. All
variables are defined in Table I.
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real Estate
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real EstateSequence Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3
1~2 462 112.6% 71.1% 19.0% 143.9% 189 119.7% 84.1% 38.5% 151.8% 201 97.9% 62.7% 7.4% 140.6% 72 135.1% 60.8% 5.6% 127.6%
2~3 347 83.3% 56.3% 0.0% 125.0% 130 99.9% 77.0% 17.4% 155.5% 167 73.8% 39.6% -2.0% 113.6% 50 71.7% 51.8% -8.6% 88.7%
3~4 231 92.4% 51.1% -0.2% 128.6% 89 122.7% 70.0% 30.8% 170.3% 101 71.9% 33.3% -11.9% 115.1% 41 77.6% 50.0% -0.2% 100.0%
4~5 163 40.7% 31.6% -32.8% 76.8% 58 52.5% 40.7% -10.5% 88.8% 72 34.1% 25.4% -35.4% 62.5% 33 34.3% 26.2% -16.3% 87.5%
5~6 100 125.7% 50.1% 12.0% 99.8% 34 146.8% 66.1% 45.7% 133.1% 44 135.8% 48.9% 0.0% 90.4% 22 72.9% 29.9% -20.0% 72.2%
6~7 66 62.6% 34.6% -35.8% 80.6% 17 39.8% 31.7% -37.5% 82.4% 36 79.2% 37.6% -32.2% 79.4% 13 46.1% 25.0% -3.6% 65.6%
7~8 38 150.0% 65.8% -14.8% 157.8% 11 277.5% 110.4% -8.2% 300.0% 21 51.3% 35.2% -20.8% 100.0% 6 262.1% 109.9% 4.2% 181.8%
8~9 23 53.3% 26.0% -48.7% 100.0% 10 102.5% 42.3% -48.7% 254.2% 12 18.8% 12.7% -35.0% 80.9% 1 -23.2% -23.2% -23.2% -23.2%
9~10 16 22.9% 11.3% -60.1% 58.6% 6 51.2% 1.0% -55.2% 94.5% 9 0.9% 7.3% -65.0% 55.5% 1 50.8% 50.8% 50.8% 50.8%
>=11 23 125.4% -1.0% -55.8% 164.1% 5 246.7% 105.0% 13.1% 225.1% 18 91.7% -11.1% -74.8% 127.3%
Total 1469 92.4% 53.8% 0.0% 123.1% 549 110.9% 70.0% 21.7% 140.3% 681 78.6% 42.9% -8.3% 113.6% 239 89.7% 48.9% -3.6% 100.6%
Sequence Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3
1~2 462 3.93 4.00 2.00 5.00 189 4.43 4.00 3.00 6.00 201 3.95 4.00 2.00 5.00 72 2.60 2.00 1.00 3.00
2~3 347 3.42 3.00 2.00 4.00 130 3.73 4.00 3.00 5.00 167 3.45 3.00 2.00 4.00 50 2.54 2.00 1.00 3.00
3~4 231 3.23 3.00 2.00 4.00 89 3.48 3.00 2.00 5.00 101 3.39 3.00 2.00 4.00 41 2.32 2.00 2.00 3.00
4~5 163 2.89 3.00 2.00 4.00 58 3.36 3.00 2.00 4.00 72 2.88 3.00 2.00 4.00 33 2.09 2.00 1.00 3.00
5~6 100 2.78 3.00 1.00 4.00 34 3.06 3.00 2.00 4.00 44 2.86 3.00 2.00 4.00 22 2.18 2.00 1.00 3.00
6~7 66 2.62 2.00 1.00 4.00 17 3.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 36 2.78 3.00 2.00 4.00 13 1.69 1.00 1.00 2.00
7~8 38 2.32 2.00 1.00 3.00 11 2.36 3.00 1.00 3.00 21 2.43 2.00 1.00 3.00 6 1.83 1.00 1.00 3.00
8~9 23 2.52 2.00 2.00 3.00 10 2.60 2.00 2.00 3.00 12 2.50 2.00 1.00 3.50 1 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
9~10 16 2.19 2.00 1.00 3.50 6 2.67 2.50 1.00 4.00 9 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
>=11 23 1.91 2.00 1.00 3.00 5 2.20 2.00 1.00 3.00 18 1.83 2.00 1.00 2.00
Total 1469 3.33 3.00 2.00 4.00 549 3.75 3.00 2.00 5.00 681 3.34 3.00 2.00 4.00 239 2.35 2.00 1.00 3.00
Sequence All BO VC RE
1 75.5% 76.5% 69.3% 96.0%
2 88.5% 88.4% 87.0% 94.3%
3 85.2% 88.1% 79.5% 95.3%
4 87.6% 89.2% 82.8% 97.1%
5 91.7% 97.1% 84.6% 100.0%
6 97.1% 100.0% 94.7% 100.0%
7 92.7% 100.0% 91.3% 85.7%
8 95.8% 100.0% 92.3% 100.0%
9 88.9% 85.7% 90.0% 100.0%
>=10 95.8% 100.0% 94.7%
Total 84.2% 85.1% 80.0% 96.0%
Panel F: Percentage of preceding funds that raise a follow-on
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real Estate
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real Estate
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow-on
Panel E. Number of years elapsed between successive funds, conditional on raising a follow-on(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Preceding fund IRR 0.316*** 0.324*** 0.467*** 0.588*** 0.297*** 0.288*** 0.187*** 0.393**
(4.788) (4.563) (4.814) (4.742) (3.337) (3.032) (2.671) (2.487)
Number of observations 1,745 1,622 645 560 851 786 249 115
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.146 0.087 0.140 0.043 0.128 0.073 0.166
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Preceding fund IRR 0.663** 0.623** 2.314*** 2.152*** 0.492 0.426 1.955*** 1.723***
(2.088) (2.045) (4.119) (3.316) (1.634) (1.413) (3.029) (2.724)
Constant 0.984*** 1.590*** 0.675*** 2.034 0.699*** 0.887*** 0.602*** -0.107***
(11.545) (2.770) (7.390) (1.569) (9.902) (4.489) (4.810) (-2.691)
Number of observations 1,469 1,469 549 549 681 681 239 239
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.038 0.058 0.075 0.021 0.027 0.014 0.036
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Preceding fund IRR 0.177*** 0.161*** 0.524*** 0.466*** 0.139** 0.101** 0.572*** 0.503***
(2.813) (2.798) (5.065) (3.967) (2.553) (2.120) (3.280) (2.901)
Constant 0.991*** 1.126*** 0.926*** 1.114*** 0.886*** 1.003*** 0.853*** 0.662***
(52.650) (12.882) (45.103) (6.450) (59.797) (13.045) (23.575) (60.784)
Number of observations 1,469 1,469 549 549 681 681 239 239
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.070 0.050 0.081 0.033 0.088 0.024 0.073
Table III
Follow-on Fundraising Regressions
Preceding fund-level regressions to explain follow-on fundraising. Panel A presents probit regressions in which the dependent
variable is 1 if a follow-on is raised and 0 otherwise. Marginal effects are reported and z-scores are given in parentheses. Panels B
and C present OLS regressions for preceding funds that raise a follow-on fund. In Panel B, the dependent variable is fund growth,
defined as follow-on fund size divided by preceding fund size minus one. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of fund growth plus two, i.e. the natural logarithm of follow-on fund size divided by preceding fund size plus one . In
all Panels,“All Funds” regressions include fund type fixed effects and model (2) includes vintage year fixed effects.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the PE firm level. In Panels B and C, t-statistics are given in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Probit regressions for the probability of raising a follow-on fund
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real Estate
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real Estate
Panel B: OLS regressions for growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow-on fund
Panel C: OLS regressions for log(fund growth + 2) conditional on raising a follow-on fund
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real Estate(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Preceding fund IRR 0.305*** 0.287*** 0.698*** 0.683*** 0.214*** 0.199*** 0.227 0.144
(4.082) (4.141) (5.447) (4.925) (3.159) (3.427) (1.578) (1.055)
Preceding fund sequence number 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.004 -0.004
(7.425) (7.470) (5.724) (5.035) (5.849) (5.780) (0.287) (-0.338)
Preceding fund IRR*Preceding fund sequence # -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.091*** -0.075** -0.034** -0.039*** 0.004 0.041
(-2.686) (-2.957) (-3.500) (-2.494) (-2.019) (-2.777) (0.087) (0.888)
Constant 0.738*** 0.927*** 0.650*** 0.802*** 0.696*** 0.902*** 0.915*** 0.993***
(32.868) (39.113) (18.709) (21.140) (28.294) (43.013) (21.005) (58.993)
Number of observations 1,745 1,745 645 645 851 851 249 249
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.124 0.110 0.135 0.043 0.137 0.015 0.068
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Preceding fund IRR 1.950*** 1.911*** 1.977** 1.537 1.964*** 1.936*** 3.899*** 3.369***
(3.142) (3.079) (2.093) (1.640) (2.695) (2.619) (2.886) (2.611)
Preceding fund sequence number 0.040 0.050 0.016 0.011 0.034 0.056 0.036 0.011
(1.246) (1.565) (0.301) (0.247) (0.888) (1.539) (0.433) (0.131)
Preceding fund IRR*Preceding fund sequence # -0.376** -0.375** 0.127 0.215 -0.423** -0.433** -0.708** -0.603*
(-2.468) (-2.501) (0.355) (0.610) (-2.464) (-2.536) (-2.103) (-1.704)
Constant 0.813*** 1.333** 0.636*** 2.092* 0.562*** 0.607*** 0.496 -0.183
(6.011) (2.322) (3.768) (1.657) (4.221) (2.588) (1.604) (-1.618)
Number of observations 1,469 1,469 549 549 681 681 239 239
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.055 0.056 0.076 0.060 0.067 0.018 0.039
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Preceding fund IRR 0.400*** 0.388*** 0.580*** 0.466** 0.358*** 0.334*** 1.179*** 1.039***
(5.390) (5.282) (2.761) (2.197) (4.288) (3.800) (3.598) (3.219)
Preceding fund sequence number -0.010** -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.014** -0.008 0.011 0.005
(-2.037) (-1.534) (-0.333) (-0.696) (-2.512) (-1.440) (0.506) (0.223)
Preceding fund IRR*Preceding fund sequence # -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.021 -0.001 -0.063*** -0.066*** -0.221** -0.196**
(-3.062) (-3.237) (-0.305) (-0.014) (-2.831) (-3.057) (-2.477) (-2.064)
Constant 1.006*** 1.104*** 0.935*** 1.123*** 0.925*** 0.991*** 0.821*** 0.636***
(45.394) (13.539) (23.543) (6.858) (39.443) (14.805) (10.612) (19.044)
Number of observations 1,469 1,469 549 549 681 681 239 239
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.085 0.047 0.078 0.063 0.113 0.037 0.085
Table IV
Follow-on Fundraising Regressions: Sequence Interactions
Panel B: OLS regressions for growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow-on fund
Panel C: OLS regressions for log(fund growth + 2) conditional on raising a follow-on fund
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real Estate
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real Estate
Preceding fund-level regressions to explain follow-on fundraising, with sequence interactions. Panel A presents linear probability regressions in
which the dependent variable is 1 if a follow-on is raised and 0 otherwise. Panels B and C present OLS regressions for preceding funds that raise a
follow-on fund. In Panel B, the dependent variable is fund growth, defined as follow-on fund size divided by preceding fund size minus one. In
Panel C, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of fund growth plus two, i.e. follow-on fund size divided by preceding fund size plus one.
In all Panels,“All Funds” regressions include fund type fixed effects and model (2) includes vintage year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are clustered at the PE firm level. T-statistics are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Linear probability model for the probability of raising a follow-on fund
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real EstateAll funds Buyout Venture Real Estate
Current fund is first in sequence
Mean current fund size ($M) 262.3 417.5 124.0 286.4
Mean current fund IRR 15.75% 17.23% 14.04% 17.50%
Years between cash in/out 3 3 3 3
Revenue share 25% 25% 25% 25%
Incremental GP revenue ($M) 2.659 4.340 1.220 2.991
Discounted 5% 2.297 3.749 1.054 2.584
k !TR/!IRR !TR/!D !TR/!IRR !TR/!D k N=3 N=5
15% 1.347 0.128 3.215 0.305 15% 0.587 1.400
20% 1.797 0.170 4.287 0.407 20% 0.782 1.867
25% 2.246 0.213 5.359 0.508 25% 0.978 2.333
k !TR/!IRR !TR/!D !TR/!IRR !TR/!D k N=3 N=5
15.75% 4.667 0.271 12.391 0.720 15.75% 1.245 3.305
17.72% 5.250 0.305 13.940 0.810 17.72% 1.400 3.718
19.60% 5.807 0.337 15.419 0.896 19.60% 1.549 4.113
k !TR/!IRR !TR/!D !TR/!IRR !TR/!D k N=3 N=5
20.24% 0.593 0.123 1.073 0.222 20.24% 0.563 1.018
22.84% 0.670 0.138 1.211 0.250 22.84% 0.635 1.149
26.11% 0.765 0.158 1.385 0.286 26.11% 0.726 1.314
k !TR/!IRR !TR/!D !TR/!IRR !TR/!D k N=3 N=5
15% 2.311 0.195 4.447 0.375 15% 0.894 1.721
20% 3.081 0.260 5.929 0.500 20% 1.193 2.295




Panel B presents estimates of the indirect effect of a one percentage point or one dollar improvement in net return to LPs in the current
fund on the present value (using a 5% discount rate) of expected GP revenue from future funds. Estimates are computed using the
formulas provided in Sections II and V, using sample parameters from Table II and regression coefficients and marginal effects from
Table III. N is the maximum number of future funds the GP could potentially run. k is the expected fraction of future fund sizes that the











Panel A: Direct effect of incremental performance on GP revenue from current fund
Table V
Sensitivity of GP Lifetime Revenue to Current Performance
This table presents estimates of the sensitivity of GP lifetime revenue to current performance, assuming the current fund is the first in
the partnership's sequence of funds. Panel A presents estimates of the direct effect of a one percentage point improvement in net return
to LPs (IRR) in the current fund, relative to the sample average return, on GP revenue from the current fund. Sample means are taken
from Table II. We approximate the cash flow distribution that gives rise to the IRR as a single cash in and a single cash out, spaced 3
years apart. The GP revenue share of 25% is based on the standard carry of 20% (for each $1 returned to LPs, GPs receive $0.25). At the
baseline level of performance, the carry is in the money. We discount the incremental GP revenue at 5% for 3 years because the
cashflow out is 3 years in the future. The discounted direct effect per extra undiscounted dollar of return to LPs is therefore $0.216.
Indirect effect ($M)
Panel B: Indirect effect of incremental performance on GP expected revenue from future funds
Ratio of indirect to direct effectAll funds Buyout Venture Real Estate
Current fund is first in sequence
Mean current fund size ($M) 262.3 417.5 124.0 286.4
Mean current fund IRR 15.75% 17.23% 14.04% 17.50%
Incremental GP revenue ($M) 2.659 4.340 1.220 2.991
Discounted 5% 2.297 3.749 1.054 2.584
Current fund is second in sequence
Mean current fund size ($M) 362.9 587.8 169.9 438.0
Mean current fund IRR 13.45% 16.83% 10.56% 14.56%
Incremental GP revenue ($M) 3.534 6.069 1.572 4.349
Discounted 5% 3.053 5.243 1.358 3.757
Current fund is third in sequence
Mean current fund size ($M) 488.2 812.5 216.3 530.0
Mean current fund IRR 12.41% 15.62% 10.14% 11.59%
Incremental GP revenue ($M) 4.668 8.216 1.985 4.994
Discounted 5% 4.033 7.097 1.715 4.314
k=20%
Current fund sequence !TR/!IRR !TR/!D !TR/!IRR !TR/!D Current fund sequence N=3 N=5
1 1.508 0.143 2.200 0.209 1 0.657 0.958
2 1.683 0.120 2.045 0.146 2 0.551 0.670
3 1.510 0.082 1.150 0.062 3 0.374 0.285
k=17.72%
Current fund sequence !TR/!IRR !TR/!D !TR/!IRR !TR/!D Current fund sequence N=3 N=5
1 5.418 0.315 11.303 0.657 1 1.445 3.015
2 7.685 0.319 13.722 0.570 2 1.466 2.617
3 10.497 0.322 15.118 0.464 3 1.479 2.130
k=22.84%
Current fund sequence !TR/!IRR !TR/!D !TR/!IRR !TR/!D Current fund sequence N=3 N=5
1 0.510 0.105 0.643 0.133 1 0.484 0.610
2 0.530 0.085 0.596 0.096 2 0.390 0.439
3 0.388 0.049 0.307 0.039 3 0.226 0.179
k=20%
Current fund sequence !TR/!IRR !TR/!D !TR/!IRR !TR/!D Current fund sequence N=3 N=5
1 3.908 0.329 6.119 0.516 1 1.513 2.368
2 3.921 0.227 6.388 0.370 2 1.044 1.700
3 3.436 0.174 5.906 0.298 3 0.796 1.369
Table VI
Sensitivity of GP Lifetime Revenue to Current Performance in the Sequence of Funds
This table presents estimates of the sensitivity of GP lifetime revenue to current performance, for different assumptions about the
placement of the current fund in the partnership's sequence of funds. Throughout, the discount rate is 5%. Panel A presents estimates
of the direct effect of a one percentage point improvement in net return to LPs (IRR) in the current fund, relative to the sample
average return, on GP revenue from the current fund. Sample means are taken from Table II. We approximate the cash flow
distribution that gives rise to the IRR as a single cash in and a single cash out, spaced 3 years apart. The GP revenue share of 25% is
based on the standard carry of 20% (for each $1 returned to LPs, GPs receive $0.25). At the baseline level of performance, the carry
is in the money. We discount the incremental GP revenue at 5% for 3 years because the cashflow out is 3 years in the future. The
discounted direct effect per extra undiscounted dollar of return to LPs is therefore $0.216.
Panel B presents estimates of the indirect effect of an improvement in net return to LPs in the current fund on expected GP revenue
from future funds. Estimates are computed using the formulas provided in Section V, using sample parameters from Table II and
regression coefficients from Table IV which take sequence interactions into account. N is the maximum number of future funds the
GP could potentially run. k is the expected fraction of future fund sizes that the GP receives as compensation. !TR/!IRR and !TR/!D
are the incremental indirect effect from an extra percentage point and extra dollar of return, respectively.
N=3 N=5
All Funds All Funds
Panel A: Direct effect of incremental performance on GP revenue from current fund
Panel B: Indirect effect of incremental performance on GP expected revenue from future funds






Real Estate Real EstateCorrelation
Number of observations
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Preceding fund interim IRR 0.383*** 0.459*** 0.484*** 0.574*** 0.345** 0.399** 0.159 1.048*
(3.165) (3.400) (3.361) (3.437) (2.117) (2.229) (1.486) (1.738)
Number of observations 801 715 304 255 433 383 64 18
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.124 0.096 0.142 0.055 0.140 0.034 0.198
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Preceding fund interim IRR 0.126** 0.099** 0.203 0.217 0.099** 0.062* 0.816*** 0.660***
(2.369) (2.247) (1.631) (1.611) (2.086) (1.741) (3.887) (4.129)
Constant 0.947*** 1.108*** 0.934*** 1.125*** 0.825*** 0.960*** 0.685*** 0.796***
(41.144) (15.555) (32.282) (10.530) (52.100) (13.148) (9.497) (27.411)
Number of observations 651 651 251 251 339 339 61 61
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.116 0.013 0.123 0.018 0.120 0.112 0.263







Panel B: Probit regressions for the probability of raising a follow-on fund
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real Estate




Correlation between Interim and Final IRRs and Sensitivity of Follow-on Fundraising to Interim Performance
Panel A presents correlations between interim IRR at time of fundraising and final IRR for all preceding funds for which interim
IRR data are available. For preceding funds that do not raise a follow-on, we use the interim IRR after three years (the sample
average time to next fundraising). Panels B and C present preceding fund-level regressions to explain follow-on fundraising using
this interim IRR. Panel B presents probit regressions in which the dependent variable is 1 if a follow-on is raised and 0 otherwise.
Marginal effects are reported and z-scores are given in parentheses. Panel C presents OLS regressions for preceding funds that
raise a follow-on fund. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of fund growth plus two. In Panels B and
C,“All Funds” regressions include fund type fixed effects and model (2) includes vintage year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are clustered at the PE firm level. In Panel C, t-statistics are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Correlation between Interim IRR at time of fundraising and Final IRR
All Funds Buyout Venture Capital Real EstateFigure 1: Ratio of indirect to direct pay for performance 
This figure presents estimates of the ratio of the indirect to direct effect of an incremental improvement in performance in the current fund on GP
revenue. The indirect effect is the estimated effect on expected revenue from future funds, while the direct effect comes from carried interest in the
current fund. The figure presents estimates computed using the formulas provided in Section V, sample parameters from Table II, and regression
coefficients from Table IV. Estimates are computed for all funds taken together, buyout funds, venture capital funds, and real estate funds, for
different assumptions about the current fund's placement in the partnership's sequence of funds. All estimates assume N, the number of potential
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